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INTRODUCTION 
Modern class action litigation began in 1966, when the Federal Civil Rules 
Advisory Committee completed a revolutionary set of revisions to Rule 23 of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fifteen years of tumult followed, as the 
legal community struggled to test the new device’s potential and identify its 
limits. The class action’s waters then calmed, and by the end of the Reagan 
Administration, some viewed the Rule 23 experiment as nearing its end.1 But 
the turbulence started again before the 1980s finished, and heated combat 
over class action law and policy has continued since then. The late 1980s and 
early 1990s were therefore a crucial period. During these years the class action 
moved onto the evolutionary course it continues to follow. 
Several episodes triggered policymakers’ reengagement with class action law 
during these years. But perhaps most consequential was the short but 
supercharged life of the mass tort class action. I tell this story here, as an 
installment in my series on the history of the modern class action.2 My focus is 
the constellation of events that led to Amchem,3 the stunning class settlement 
proposed in 1993 to resolve millions of asbestos-related claims. Although the 
story of the mass tort class action has several important chapters, the Amchem one 
is surely the first among equals, for the potential it had to remake the law of 
complex litigation, and for its pervasive and lasting influence on class action 
doctrine. Had Rule 23 proven able to encompass mass tort litigation, it would 
have shown its mettle in Amchem. The settlement’s failure largely ended the mass 
tort class action experiment, at least for two decades.4 
The mass tort class action’s story has abundant intrinsic interest, but it is 
worth telling for other reasons as well. First, its short life began and ended at 
a key moment in litigation history. The modern class action debuted during an 
era when the institutional footprint of private civil litigation expanded 
considerably.5 This development sparked a reaction, as critics faulted with 
 
1 Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1988, at B7 
(noting that the number of class actions swelled in the 1970s but had fallen since then); Nicholas C. 
McBride, Class-Action Suit Out of Fashion in Today’s Law Cases. Court Rulings Make Lawsuits Filed by 
Group Less Attractive, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 1988, at 19 (discussing a decline in class 
action filings from the 1970s to the 1980s). 
2 See generally David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part II: Litigation and 
Legitimacy, 1981-1994, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); David Marcus, The History of the 
Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953-1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587 (2013) 
[hereinafter Marcus, Sturm und Drang]; David Marcus, Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and 
its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63 FLA. L. REV. 657 (2011). 
3 The Amchem case went through several names, including Carlough and Georgine. 
4 See infra text accompanying note 275 (discussing NFL Concussion litigation). 
5 See SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE 
LAWSUITS IN THE U.S. 5–16 (2010) (observing that the rate of private litigation brought in federal 
courts “exploded” in the late 1960s). 
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increasing vehemence a perceived surfeit of judicial power exercised through 
the supervision of litigation. By the early 1990s, class action law and policy had 
become an important front in a larger war, fought over the right response to a 
basic query—how much weight can private civil litigation legitimately bear?6 
The failure of the mass tort class action, coinciding with other developments, 
provided a more restrictive answer. Second, the episode has had a long afterlife, 
one that has continued to influence the law of complex litigation. The mass tort 
class action contributed significantly to an important shift in the governing 
structure for the supervision of class action doctrine. This shift has ensured that 
a restrictive legal regime regulates Rule 23’s administration. 
Part I describes the origins of the mass tort class action in the path-
breaking decisions of two judicial mavericks in the early 1980s. Amchem’s 
story comes in Part II. Part III documents the lasting influence the mass tort 
episode has had on the governance of class action doctrine. 
I. ORIGINS 
A proper understanding of the origins of the mass tort class action 
requires a simple conceptual distinction.7 From the earliest days of the 
modern class action, judges and policymakers understood that Rule 23 might 
have relevance for mass accident litigation, or the litigation of multiple claims 
arising from a single, localized catastrophe like an airplane crash.8 The 
possibility that Rule 23 would intersect with dispersed mass tort litigation—
the litigation of personal injury claims arising from the diffuse exposure to 
injurious products or substances—seemed more remote. Even Rule 23’s most 
ardent champions excluded it from their sense of the class action’s domain. 
Only in the early 1980s, with decisions by two judicial mavericks, did the link 
between the class action and dispersed mass tort litigation really emerge. 
A. Early Reluctance 
The use of aggregative techniques to manage dispersed mass tort 
litigation only began in the early 1960s,9 making the class action’s relevance 
hard to imagine. But the members of the Advisory Committee that authored 
the 1966 rule certainly anticipated that mass accident litigators might attempt 
 
6 I owe Bob Bone for this formulation. 
7 See In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 725 (4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing between 
two types of mass tort suits—those arising from a single accident, and those that are more diffuse). 
8 See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 179 (1969) (suggesting that Rule 
23 could prove useful for the management of mass accident litigation). 
9 Paul D. Rheingold, MER/29: Looking Back at the First Mass Tort Drug Case, TRIAL, Aug. 2014, 
at 26, 26. For a sense of the primitive procedural state of mass tort litigation in the early 1960s, see 
generally Note, Consolidation in Mass Tort Litigation, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 373 (1963). 
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to use the new Rule 23.10 Concern that class actions might generate binding 
judgments for a large group of accident victims helped to derail an effort to 
revise Rule 23 in the early 1950s.11 When the revision process began in earnest 
in the early 1960s, the specter of a collusively litigated mass accident class 
action rigged to settle personal injury liability cheaply haunted the Advisory 
Committee.12 The committee ultimately agreed that “a very exceptional mass 
accident case could qualify” under Rule 23(b)(3), given class members’ rights 
to opt out.13 Some members found the mass accident class action a less 
discomfiting prospect.14 But the committee anticipated the use of other tools, 
not Rule 23, for the aggregate management of personal injury claims.15 
The judicial attitude toward Rule 23’s use for air crash cases and the like 
remained tentative and unsettled throughout the 1970s.16 Choice of law 
problems, the superiority of other mechanisms for case management, and the 
interest of individual litigants in personal control of valuable claims created 
obstacles to certification.17 When the Advisory Committee surveyed federal 
 
10 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation”, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-17 
(1991) (describing the Committee members’ views). 
11 When Charles Clark introduced his revised Rule 23 to the Advisory Committee at a meeting 
in May 1953, the very first interruption came from Bill Moore, who wanted to know whether it could 
be used to dragoon tort victims into a particular case. Transcript, Advisory Committee on Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 111 (May 18, 1953), http://www.uscourts.gov. Clark’s response was “probably 
yes.” Id. Moore opposed the revamped Rule 23 for this reason. Transcript, Advisory Committee on 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 157-58 (Mar. 1955), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-523-55 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
12 See, e.g., John P. Frank, Advisory Committee on Civil Rules: Dissenting View of Committee 
Member 2 (May 28, 1965), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. 
CI-7107-01 (Cong. Info. Serv.) (“The corruption potential of the binding spurious class action intimidates 
me. These cases are terribly easy to rig—a bright child could do it. I would not hold out the bait.”). 
13 Discussion of Responses to Memorandum of December 2, 1963 3 (Jan. 31, 1964), in RECORDS 
OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7003-08 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
14 See, e.g., Transcript, Meeting of the Federal Rules Advisory Committee 13 (Oct. 31-Nov. 2, 
1963), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-7104-53 
(Cong. Info. Serv.) (comments of Charles Alan Wright) (insisting that “the mass accident” class 
action “doesn’t bother me a bit”). 
15 Andrew Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action “Alternative”, 
165 U. PA. L. REV. 1715-17 (2017) (commenting on members’ expectations that the soon-to-be-passed 
MDL statute, not Rule 23, would govern claim aggregation for mass torts). 
16 See, e.g., Vincent v. Hughes Air West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759, 767 (9th Cir. 1977) (describing 
contrasting views in relevant case law); Causey v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 392, 397 
(E.D. Va. 1975) (same). 
17 For decisions denying class certification, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States 
Dist. Court, 523 F.2d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1975); Marchesi v. E. Airlines, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 500, 501-02 
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); Boring v. Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 84-85 (M.D. Pa. 1974); Daye 
v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1342-43 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Hobbs v. Ne. 
Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970). For decisions granting class certification, see Coburn 
v. 4-R Corp., 77 F.R.D. 43, 45 (E.D. Ky. 1977); Bentkowski v. Marfuerza Compania Martima, S.A., 
70 F.R.D. 401, 405 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Hernandez v. Motor Vessel Skyward, 61 F.R.D. 558, 562 (S.D. 
Fla. 1973); Petition of Gabel, 350 F. Supp. 624, 629 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. 
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judges in 1977 and asked whether “Rule 23 is capable of disposing efficiently 
of mass accident claims,” slightly more than half answered yes.18 In contrast, 
federal judges uniformly refused to certify dispersed mass tort classes until 
the very end of the 1970s.19 
This disinclination reflected the distance between the realities of personal 
injury litigation, on one hand, and the primary normative foundation for a 
powerful class action device that those who favored class litigation laid during 
Rule 23’s first era, on the other. To the new rule’s critics, class certification 
and the approval of class settlements required judges to wield extraordinary, 
arguably illegitimate, power. To find that common issues of law and fact 
predominate over individual ones, judges had to adjust the substantive law, 
to downplay individual legal and factual issues as marginally relevant to the 
adjudication of the defendant’s liability, or to remake these issues into 
common ones.20 To impose a class-wide judgment or approve a class-wide 
settlement, judges wrested control over claims from their individual owners.21 
Proponents of an aggressive, powerful Rule 23 defended what I have called 
a “regulatory conception” of the device as a response to such concerns.22 By their 
view, the class action’s primary objective was not individual compensation but 
regulatory efficacy, or the successful alteration of defendants’ behavior through 
the vindication of substantive liability regimes. A class action properly targeted 
the aggregate effects of the defendant’s conduct as experienced by a group of 
undifferentiated regulatory beneficiaries. Without aggregation, claims would lie 
dormant, and regulatory regimes would go unenforced. For these reasons, 
supporters argued, judges could rightly downplay conflicts of interest among 
individual class members, overlook or deemphasize individual legal issues that 
differed from one class member’s claim to the next, and soften due process 
protections for class members. By stressing common issues over individual ones, 
 
Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 47 F.R.D. 155, 157 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass’n, 
48 F.R.D. 333, 337 (D.R.I. 1969). 
18 Responses to Rule 23 Questionnaire (May 12, 1977), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE, microformed on CIS No. CI-6509-32 (Cong. Info. Serv.). 
19 For decisions denying class certification for dispersed classes, see Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
84 F.R.D. 230, 234 (D.S.C. 1979); Van Harville v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., Civ. No. 78-642, 
1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9501, at *54 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 27, 1979); Yandle v. PPG Industries, Inc., 65 
F.R.D. 566, 571-72 (E.D. Tex. 1974); Harrigan v. United States, 63 F.R.D. 402, 409 (E.D. Pa. 1974). 
20 See, e.g., Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class 
Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 861–67 (1974) (describing 
substantive law changes made to facilitate class certification); William Simon, Class Actions—Useful 
Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 383-386 (1973) (arguing that courts change substantive 
law to facilitate class certification). 
21 See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1127 (5th Cir. 1969) 
(Goldbold, J., concurring) (criticizing such actions in Title VII class actions). 
22 The discussion in this paragraph is based on Marcus, Sturm und Drang, supra note 2, at 592-593. 
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courts could facilitate class certification, enable aggregate adjudication, and 
thereby ensure that the class action discharged its regulatory task. 
Complaints about the illegitimate exercise of what amounted to law 
reform power through the supervision of litigation rang more hollow when 
cases really centered on defendants’ undifferentiated treatment of all class 
members,23 or when class members’ claims had such marginal value that 
possibly no class member cared about losing control over their rights to sue.24 
But personal injury cases lacked these characteristics.25 An alleged tortfeasor’s 
liability often depends in large measure on proof of individual causation, an 
issue rarely amenable to aggregate adjudication.26 Even issues that seemed 
common, like general causation, may not be so. Unlike other types of federal 
class actions in the 1970s,27 mass tort litigation implicated multiple states’ tort 
law and for that reason the prospect that different bodies of law would apply 
to different class members’ claims. Also, tort victims often have valuable 
claims, so concern about judicial usurpation of their individual control cannot 
be dismissed as formalistic.28 Finally, the principal justification for the 
regulatory conception, that regulatory efficacy requires the sort of claim 
mobilization that only aggregation can generate, misfired for mass torts, 
where claim value incentivized plenty of individual litigation.29 
The class action figured importantly in a more general debate that raged in the 
1970s about the legitimate size of litigation’s institutional footprint.30 What had 
begun in the 1960s as a technocratic concern over rising caseloads morphed the next 
decade into a darker narrative about a pathological “litigation explosion.”31 Critics 
of American civil justice lamented that excessive litigiousness among 
 
23 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Lord, 585 F.2d 860, 872 (8th Cir. 1978); Paddison v. Fidelity 
Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
24 Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 944 (1975). 
25 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 393 (1967). 
26 Susan E. Silbersweig, Case Note, Payton v. Abbott Laboratories: An Analysis of the 
Massachusetts DES Class Action Suit, 6 AM. J.L. & MED. 243, 263 (1980) (quoting a 1977 decision 
denying class certification in a dispersed mass tort case). 
27 Decisions limiting the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts meant that most 
federal class actions litigated in the 1970s arose under federal law. Marcus, Sturm und Drang, supra 
note 2, at 627-28. 
28 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Ne. Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76, 79 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (acknowledging the 
interests of claimants in litigating independently). 
29 See, e.g., Daye v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 344 F. Supp. 1337, 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1972) 
(observing that a significant number of individual plaintiffs had already filed suit in a putative class action). 
30 See A.E. Dick Howard, A Litigation Society?, WILSON Q., Summer 1981, at 98, 102; see also 
The Chilling Impact of Litigation: Easier Access to the Courts Means Skyrocketing Costs and Interminable 
Delays, BUS. WEEK, June 6, 1977, at 58, 63; Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law 
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1291 (1976) [hereinafter Chayes, Role]. 
31 Marc Galanter, The Turn Against Law: The Recoil Against Expanding Accountability, 81 TEX. 
L. REV. 285, 292-93 (2002). 
2017] Short Life, Long Afterlife 1571 
Americans32 and judges’ inability to keep frivolous or trivial claims off their 
dockets33 meant that courts attracted too many disputes.34 Relatedly,35 according 
to critics, an “imperial judiciary” had emerged by the mid-1970s, illegitimately 
claiming power over an ever-expanding array of social, political, and economic 
problems that had previously remained the province of the political branches.36 
Abram Chayes offered the most important response to these charges.37 
He agreed with critics that “[i]n our received tradition, the lawsuit is a vehicle 
for settling disputes between private parties about private rights.”38 
Conceived thusly, “the process is party-initiated and party-controlled,” with 
the judge a passive, neutral participant who acts only when the parties request 
it.39 By the mid-1970s, however, litigation had evolved to include “sprawling 
and amorphous” endeavors “about the operation of public policy.”40 Chayes 
insisted that groups could and should make transformative changes to social 
or economic orders through lawsuits, with remedies designed for behavior 
and policy modification to benefit diffuse members of the public. Such 
litigation does not stand apart from political or administrative processes but 
functions as a different channel for the pursuit of the same ends.41 The specific 
parties recede into the background, with the judge becoming “the dominant 
figure in organizing and guiding the case.”42 
Chayes articulated a version of the regulatory conception as his 
understanding of the class action.43 Part of his defense of the surfeit of judicial 
power that public law litigation entailed drew on the conception’s normative 
foundation: the exercise of this power enabled the vindication of substantive 
legal regimes that might otherwise go unenforced.44 Chayes included all types 
of the 1970s-era class action as exemplars of public law litigation.45 But mass tort 
litigation was not a species within his genus. To Chayes, the leading defender of 
 
32 Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982). 
33 See, e.g., Chilling Impact, supra note 30, at 63. 
34 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 5 (1981). 
35 Id. at 4-7. 
36 See Nathan Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, PUB. INT. Fall 1975, at 114-17 (describing 
the trend of growing judicial power); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL 
POLICY 4 (1976) (discussing the expansion of judicial responsibility since the 1960s). 
37 Chayes, Role, supra note 30. 
38 Id. at 1282; see also Howard, supra note 30, at 102. 
39 Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1283. 
40 Id. at 1302. 
41 Id. at 1304. 
42 Id. at 1284. 
43 Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger 
Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26-27 (1982) (characterizing the class action device as an instrument for 
“reformist litigators” seeking to assert group interests). 
44 Id. at 27; Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1314. 
45 Chayes, Role, supra note 30, at 1284 (referencing employment discrimination, school 
desegregation, and other class actions). 
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litigation’s big footprint (and the judicial power it implied), personal injury cases 
exemplified traditional, party-centered and party-controlled lawsuits.46 
B. Two Judicial Mavericks 
The first breach in the dam came in 1979, when a district judge certified 
a class of Massachusetts women exposed to diethylstilbestrol (DES), to 
litigate as a group a number of issues common to their increased risk of 
cancer claims.47 This innovation proved short-lived. The judge decertified 
the class when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court rejected the 
availability of enterprise liability for those plaintiffs who could not identify 
which specific company bore responsibility for their exposure.48 Other 
courts refused to certify DES classes.49 
The iconoclastic Spencer Williams,50 the next federal judge to certify a 
dispersed mass tort class, pushed harder. Already a class action pioneer,51 
Williams turned to Rule 23 to address the escalating litigation disaster 
prompted by the 1972 recall of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine birth control 
device.52 After spending nine weeks trying a single case,53 Williams in 1982 
certified a mandatory, non–opt-out national class of all Dalkon Shield plaintiffs 
under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to litigate the issue of punitive damages.54 He also 
certified a smaller, California-only class under Rule 23(b)(3) to litigate the issue 
of the defendant’s liability.55 Ruling sua sponte, Williams made only cursory 
predominance and superiority findings to support the (b)(3) certification, and 
vague limited fund findings for the (b)(1)(B) portion.56 He clearly expected 
that his decision would prompt the parties to enter a global settlement.57 
 
46 Id. at 1283. 
47 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 83 F.R.D. 382, 385 (D. Mass. 1979); In Camera, 5 CLASS ACTION 
REP. 469, 469 (1978); Silbersweig, supra note 26, at 243-44. 
48 Payton v. Abbott Labs, 100 F.R.D. 336, 338-39 (D. Mass. 1983). 
49 See Mertens v. Abbott Laboratories, 99 F.R.D. 38, 42 (D.N.H. 1983); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly 
& Co., 93 F.R.D. 875, 880 (D.S.D. 1982); Silbersweig, supra note 26, at 247 (describing one such 
decision in Illinois). 
50 For example, Judge Williams served as a class representative three times in suits against the federal 
government seeking raises for federal judges. See Terry Carter, Bucking for a Raise, 84 A.B.A.  J. 32 (1998). 
51 See, e.g., In re Consolidated Pre-Trial Proceedings in Memorex Security Cases, 61 F.R.D. 88, 
97 & n.7 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (certifying a class in an innovative early securities fraud decision). 
52 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: 
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 961, 985 (1993) (describing the Dalkon Shield litigation). 
53 In re N. Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 
(N.D. Cal. 1981) (observing that any attempt to try the cases individually would “bankrupt” a court’s 
calendar). 
54 Id. at 897-98. 
55 Id. at 902-03. 
56 Id. 
57 See Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 22 JUDGES J. 8, 11 (1983). 
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Jack Weinstein soon followed Williams’s lead.58 Although Weinstein had 
once denounced personal injury class actions as a form of “legalized 
ambulance chasing,”59 he put this youthful “indiscretion” behind him in 
1983.60 He certified a mandatory national class in the famous Agent Orange 
litigation to litigate the defendants’ liability for punitive damages,61 and he 
certified everything else, including the defendants’ liability, under Rule 
23(b)(3).62 Whereas Williams’s predominance analysis was cursory, 
Weinstein’s was fanciful. He infamously determined that a single “national 
substantive rule” would govern class members’ claims, thereby dodging the 
otherwise insuperable barrier to certification created by the simultaneous 
application of dozens of states’ tort law.63 Like Williams, Weinstein expected 
the parties to settle.64 
Weinstein and Williams exercised the sort of power that Chayes had 
observed in public law judges, with Weinstein’s debt to Chayes plain.65 Both 
judges seized control of litigation without regard for individual plaintiff 
preferences.66 Neither judge paid much heed to the constraints of the 
substantive law on procedural possibilities, ignoring or assuming away legal 
and factual differences among class members’ claims. Weinstein forthrightly 
assumed the legislative mantle with his “national substantive rule.” Williams 
did so as well, if less explicitly, with his intention to displace tort law remedies 
with an equitable, pro rata distribution from a limited fund, as Rule 
23(b)(1)(B) contemplates. Under the guise of managing litigation, both judges 
 
58 Judge Weinstein took over Agent Orange after the initial judge, George Pratt, was elevated to 
the Second Circuit. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN 
THE COURTS 110 (1987). In an opinion giving barely cursory treatment to key issues like predominance, 
Judge Pratt agreed to certify an opt-out class in 1980, but never entered the order. See id. at 68-69, 
80-81; see also In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 791 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
59 Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 
469 (1960). 
60 Jack B. Weinstein & Eileen B. Hershenov, The Effect of Equity on Mass Tort Law, 1991 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 269, 288. 
61 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)). 
62 Id. at 731-32. 
63 Id. at 724. For criticism, see SCHUCK, supra note 58, at 128-31. 
64 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. at 723 (explaining this expectation). 
65 See In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 834-36 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing 
Chayes); Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469, 473 
(1994) (drawing parallels between mass tort cases and other public law cases); see also Francis E. 
McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case Law and Trends Affecting Case 
Management, 19 FORUM 1, 7 (1983) (citing Chayes and stating that some commentators see toxic 
substances litigation as a new form of public law litigation); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection 
in Mass Exposure Cases: A ‘Public Law’ Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 908-16 (1984). 
66 Elizabeth Joan Cabraser, Mandatory Certification of Settlement Classes, 10 CLASS ACT. REP. 
151, 152 (1987). 
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took on sole responsibility for significant policy problems, with Weinstein 
explicit about his exercise of power as an alternative to legislative action.67 
But in neither Dalkon Shield nor Agent Orange could claim-mobilization, 
the regulatory conception’s normative pillar, justify an aggressive 
administration of Rule 23 and with it such a robust exercise of judicial 
power.68 Williams certified the Dalkon Shield class to manage an avalanche of 
claims, not to trigger one. Thirty-four hundred individual plaintiffs filed suit 
before the class certification motion in Agent Orange.69 Rather, the mavericks 
invoked judicial economy and distributional equity to justify class 
certification. Williams explained that the “tedious and frustrating task of 
presiding over identical lawsuits” might “bankrupt both the state and federal 
court systems.”70 Also, payouts determined by individuals’ race to judgment 
might leave “later plaintiffs . . . without practical means of redress” as the 
defendants’ funds run dry.71 Although his findings as to the likelihood that 
claims would exceed the defendants’ assets were more thorough and careful 
than Williams’s,72 Weinstein ultimately based his decision to certify a 
mandatory Agent Orange class on a distributional concern. The law of punitive 
damages might cap the defendants’ liability, and thus the first plaintiffs to 
win punitive damages judgments would unfairly reap all the spoils.73 
To critics, decisions like Agent Orange proved the pathological status of 
American civil justice,74 and judicial colleagues of Williams and Weinstein 
remained mostly skeptical of the mass tort class action.75 For example, 
 
67 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that a 
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caused our soldiers and their families by its use of Agent Orange”). 
68 See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law 
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 424-31 (1999) (enumerating the ways that mass 
tort litigation does not fit within Chayes’ public law model). 
69 In Camera, 6 CLASS ACTION REP. 273, 273 (1980). 
70 Spencer Williams, Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?, 98 F.R.D. 323, 324-25 (1983). 
71 Id. at 325. 
72 In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 725-28 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
73 Id. at 725. 
74 See, e.g., Tort Reform, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1986, at 22 (criticizing the Agent Orange 
settlement); Contempt of Justice, WALL ST. J., May 14, 1985, at 28 (using the Agent Orange settlement 
as evidence of problems with the American civil justice system); Is Suing the Only Way?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 1985, at A20 (offering similar criticism). 
75 Delaney v. Borden, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 44, 44 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (noting that class certification is 
inappropriate in mass tort actions); see also In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 721 (W.D. Mo. 
1985) (confirming denial of class certification); Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 612 F. Supp. 983 (D.D.C. 
1985); Pearl v. Allied Corp., 102 F.R.D. 921, 924 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (denying class certification); 
Mertens v. Abbott Labs., 99 F.R.D. 38, 41-42 (D.N.H. 1983) (expressing skepticism of class 
certification); Sanders v. Tailored Chem. Corp., 570 F. Supp. 1543, 1543 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (discussing 
prior cases that have generally denied class certification in mass tort actions); Ruland v. Gen. Elec. 
Co., 94 F.R.D. 164, 165 (D. Conn. 1982) (denying class certification); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
93 F.R.D. 875, 877 (D.S.D. 1982) (denying class certification); David Berger, Litigation of a Class 
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Weinstein’s decision withstood appellate review, but the Second Circuit noted 
its expectation that his order would not “‘encourage the use of similar 
procedures by . . . district courts in the future.’”76 The Ninth Circuit made short 
work of Williams’s decision when 165 of the 166 plaintiffs’ lawyers with cases 
affected by the grant of class certification sought interlocutory review.77 When 
Carl Rubin, yet another maverick, certified a mandatory class of persons 
exposed in utero to a pregnancy drug in 1984, the Sixth Circuit swiftly granted 
the writ of mandamus that several plaintiffs’ lawyers requested.78 While Rubin’s 
decision may have been “commendable” “[o]n pure policy grounds,” the Sixth 
Circuit explained, it was “clearly erroneous as a matter of law.”79 
II. AMCHEM 
Within a decade, the federal judiciary committed as an institution to Rule 23’s 
use to resolve dispersed mass tort litigation. A fear of total institutional 
breakdown,80 prompted chiefly by asbestos litigation,81 moved the class action 
from the periphery to the center of the mass tort stage. As their asbestos dockets 
ballooned, judges watched with dismay as traditional litigation and other 
processes proved unable to render accurate, timely, and nonarbitrary 
determinations of claimants’ rights to recover. The Amchem settlement resulted. 
Amchem involved a remarkable attempt to use a class action to settle claims 
not yet filed by people exposed to asbestos. Had the settlement succeeded, a 
right to claim compensation from a settlement trust fund would have replaced 
millions of tort claims, a transformation of substantive rights achieved 
 
Action, 18 FORUM 335, 339 (1982–83) (acknowledging reluctance of courts to certify classes in mass 
tort claims). 
76 In re Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 725 F.2d 858, 860 (2d Cir. 1984) (quoting United 
States v. Dooling, 406 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1969)); see also In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 
818 F.2d 145, 151, 167-71 (2d Cir. 1987) (upholding the Agent Orange settlement and stressing its 
“nuisance” value). 
77 In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856-57 (9th Cir. 
1982); see also Stephen C. Yeazell, Collective Litigation as Collective Action, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 43, 
58 (1989) (describing plaintiffs’ lawyers’ reactions). 
78 In re Bendectin Prods. Liab. Litig., 749 F.2d 300, 307 (6th Cir. 1984). 
79 Id. at 306. 
80 See, e.g., In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 709, 731 (4th Cir. 1989) (emphasizing the 
need to use class action in order to cope with problems mass tort litigation created for the judiciary); 
Irving R. M. Panzer & Thomas Earl Patton, Utilizing the Class Action Device in Mass Tort Litigation, 
21 TORT & INS. L.J. 560, 568 (1985-86) (describing a fear that mass tort litigation is threatening to 
undermine the judicial system). 
81 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986); In re School Asbestos 
Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1986). The School Asbestos case did not involve personal injury 
claims. Rather, it required a very different sort of analysis that arguably made class certification 
easier and thus does not figure as a central chapter in this story. E.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Beyond 
Consolidation: Postaggregative Procedure in Asbestos Mass Tort Litigation, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 
496-97 (1991). 
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through the exercise of judicial power. Versions of the Amchem story have 
several skillful tellings.82 A central theme in existing accounts involves the 
effort of powerful plaintiffs’ lawyers cooperating with defendants to enrich 
themselves at the expense of asbestos victims. Lost in these narratives of 
corruption and collusion, however, is a central part of this history. Amchem 
happened because the federal courts wanted a class action endgame. It was as 
much the exercise of public power as it was private dealmaking. 
By 1993, Rule 23’s use for mass tort litigation was no longer a maverick’s 
frolic but the institutional preference of the federal courts. It nonetheless 
failed. The surfeit of judicial power it required lacked a sufficient justification 
or limiting principle. 
A. The Failed Alternatives 
The one-by-one litigation of asbestos cases, with an emphasis on individual 
control over claims, was “largely a myth” by the time the asbestos drama turned 
to Rule 23.83 The rising tide of asbestos filings pushed judges to exhaust various 
aggregative techniques but also to pioneer a number of case management 
strategies, which were all steps toward the sort of judicial power Chayes had 
celebrated and Weinstein and Williams had exercised. Features of the Amchem 
deal reflected both these years of futility and the innovations they spawned. 
1. The Failure of Informal Aggregation 
In the early 1980s, Thomas Lambros of the Northern District of Ohio 
noticed that several dozen lawyers would appear every time he held a case 
management conference in one of his asbestos cases. Even worse, these 
lawyers, mostly representing the many defendants joined in each case, 
sandwiched his conference in between ones elsewhere in the courthouse. The 
hours they billed offended Lambros, as did the “endless stream of procedural 
activity” these cases produced.84 
To respond, Lambros came up with his “Ohio Asbestos Litigation” 
system.85 He took over all of the asbestos cases pending in his district and 
 
82 E.g., Patrick M. Hanlon, An Experiment in Law Reform: Amchem Products v. Windsor,         
46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1279, 1279 (2013); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of 
the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1384-99 (1995); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While 
the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1995). 
83 Deborah R. Hensler, As Time Goes By: Asbestos Litigation After Amchem and Ortiz, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 1899, 1913 (2002) [hereinafter Hensler, Time Goes By]; see also Hanlon, supra note 82, at 1287. 
84 Interview with Thomas Lambros (Mar. 23, 2016), Transcript at 4 [hereinafter Lambros Interview]. 
85 Id. at 6; see also Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing Complex 
Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 480-90 (1986) (describing the implementation and ramifications 
of the Ohio Asbestos Litigation plan). 
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ordered that a single lawyer represent each asbestos company for all of its cases. 
Working with two special masters, Lambros developed form questionnaires 
designed to gather all essential information for settlement evaluation and had 
one filled out for each case. Short interviews replaced formal depositions.86 The 
information gleaned from this expedited discovery went to the RAND 
Corporation, which generated proposed settlement amounts for each case based 
on extensive historical data on comparable claims.87 Lambros scheduled 
multiple cases for a single half-day status conference and encouraged the parties 
to settle.88 At its peak, a single day’s work might produce 200-300 settlements, 
with more than $150 million changing hands.89 
Several other judges designed similar strategies, notably Robert Parker in 
the Eastern District of Texas.90 Eventually, Lambros estimates, this group 
supervised about eighty percent of the country’s asbestos docket.91 But the 
asbestos tide swallowed their efforts.92 By 1988, Parker remarked, his attempt 
to manage his way out of the asbestos morass reminded him of “the classical 
tragedies.”93 The “lamentable state of affairs” had “seen two-thirds of total 
dollars spent in asbestos litigation going to the coffers of lawyers and 
witnesses,” he bemoaned, while victims died uncompensated.94 
Informal aggregation happened outside the courtroom as well. Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers began cooperating extensively as early as 1978,95 and by the mid-1980s 
leading firms had informally divided up the country, with each representing 
hundreds, even thousands, of clients in different regions.96 On the defense 
side, three years of negotiations pursued to replace the tort system with a 
“private administrative agency” produced the Asbestos Claims Facility 
(“ACF”) in 1985.97 The ACF resolved most of the 21,000 claims it settled 
 
86 Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 7-8. 
87 Id. at 9; McGovern, supra note 85, at 488. 
88 Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 9. 
89 Id. 
90 See Judge Robert M. Parker, Memorandum to the Study Committee for the Efficient 
Disposition of Asbestos-Related Cases, Jan. 22, 1982, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 
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91 Lambros Interview, supra note 84, at 10. 
92 See Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 109 F.R.D. 269, 271 (E.D. Tex. 1985) (noting that courts 
have become so overwhelmed as to risk denying justice in asbestos-related cases). 
93 Id. at 270. 
94 Id. at 287. 
95 Robin Reisig, The Man Who Took on Manville, AM. LAW., Feb. 1983, at 65, 66. 
96 E-mail from Brent Rosenthal, Partner, Rosenthal Weiner (Apr. 21, 2016), Attachment at 2 
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97 Harry H. Wellington, Asbestos: The Private Management of a Public Problem, 33 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 375, 375 (1985); see also Lawrence Fitzpatrick, The Center for Claims Resolution, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 13 (1990). 
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through an ADR system designed to reduce transaction costs considerably.98 
But the companies had disparate settlement preferences, and the ACF 
collapsed in 1988.99 Some of the companies tried again, forming the Center 
for Claims Resolution (“CCR”) to continue with a coordinated litigation 
strategy.100 But the pace of filings increased, and defendants found themselves 
paying to settle weaker and weaker claims.101 
2. The Failure of Formal Aggregation 
Johns-Manville’s decade-long struggle with bankruptcy fueled the 
asbestos fire. “The General Motors of the asbestos industry,”102 Manville 
petitioned for Chapter 11 reorganization in 1982 when relentless filings made 
a future of inexhaustible liability inevitable.103 Six years of negotiations and 
appeals followed before the Second Circuit in 1988 finally approved a 
reorganization plan that steered all asbestos liability to a Manville-funded 
trust.104 Within months of paying its first claim, however, the Manville trust 
began to run dramatically low on funds,105 producing a mad scramble by 
plaintiffs’ lawyers eager to get their claims paid before all the money was 
gone.106 Manville quickly had to inject an additional $520 million to keep the 
trust solvent,107 and the trust’s pledge to pay claims in full, based on their 
value in the tort system,108 soon proved farcical.109 
 
98 Fitzpatrick, supra note 97, at 14; Cynthia F. Mitchell & Paul M. Barrett, Trial and Error: 
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102 Joint Appendix at 388, Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, No. 96-270 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
16, 1996) (testimony of Lawrence Fitzpatrick) [hereinafter Fitzpatrick Testimony]; see also Kane v. 
Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1988). 
103 Kane, 843 F.2d at 639; see generally PAUL D. RHEINGOLD, LITIGATING MASS TORT CASES 
§ 11:11 (2016). Manville had badly misapprehended its asbestos liability. Shirley Hobbs Scheibla, 
Heat on Asbestos: Legislative, Legal Challenges to Producers Mount, BARRON’S, Mar. 5, 1979, at 4 
(quoting Manville’s president’s rosy projections regarding the company’s future liability). 
104 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
105 Id. at 754-58. 
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107 In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 120 B.R. 648, 653 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
108 Hensler, supra note 83, at 1919. 
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Manville’s bankruptcy was a “game-changer.”110 Other companies noted 
the difficulty Manville had faced in estimating its future liability.111 Plaintiffs’ 
lawyers expected that their clients would have to take haircuts and thus 
predicted “devastation to the asbestos personal injury victims.”112 Their 
primary target gone, these lawyers developed cases against a broader array of 
defendants,113 looking harder for cases in a race to get ahead of more 
bankruptcies.114 Consequently, filings exploded,115 with many of the newer 
cases alleging marginal injuries or nothing at all.116 Some defendants 
responded by refusing to settle claims en masse. They insisted on taking cases 
to trial, worsening the backlog further.117 
Parker’s Jenkins and Cimino experiments were another failed effort at 
formal aggregation. Convinced that creative case management could not 
staunch the asbestos bleeding,118 Parker certified an opt-out class of Eastern 
District of Texas claimants (the Jenkins class) in 1985 to resolve issues 
involving asbestos companies’ knowledge of their products’ dangerousness 
and their liability for punitive damages.119 Individual plaintiffs would then 
litigate individual causation and comparative fault issues in subsequent 
“mini-trials.”120 The Fifth Circuit upheld Parker’s plan against efforts by the 
defendants to scuttle it, remarking that “[n]ecessity moves us to change and 
invent.”121 The effort seemed to work. Five weeks into the class trial, the 
parties struck a $110 million deal and wiped Parker’s docket nearly clean.122 
He conditioned his approval on the lawyers’ willingness to agree to arbitrate 
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all claims not covered by the class settlement.123 Some observers celebrated 
this innovation as the golden ticket out of the asbestos morass.124 
But Jenkins quickly fell apart. Filings outpaced ADR dispositions by a 
considerable measure,125 and some defendants refused to settle cases as the plan 
had anticipated.126 In response, Parker certified another Eastern District of 
Texas class (the Cimino class) and ordered a multiphase, classwide trial to resolve 
all elements of members’ claims. Trials on liability and damages for a 
representative sample of plaintiffs would proceed. From these sample verdicts 
Parker would extrapolate the defendants’ total liability, as well as determine how 
much claimants in different injury categories would receive.127 Defendants—
who distrusted Parker and disliked his district—detested this plan,128 especially 
after it produced anomalously high values for certain disease categories.129 They 
successfully petitioned the Fifth Circuit for a writ of mandamus.130 
B. The Institutional Commitment 
Lambros and Parker, along with other colleagues, had tried to seize 
control of asbestos litigation. But their efforts fell short, even as they 
normalized dramatic departures from litigation in the mold of the “received 
tradition” that Chayes had described. What came next was an institutional 
commitment to the path they and their maverick predecessors had blazed. 
1. Chaos 
By the end of the 1980s, an “air of judicial desperation” had set in.131 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers sensed that legislation,132 an onslaught of bankruptcies,133 
or some other dramatic alteration to asbestos litigation to that point was 
inevitable. Even litigators who had previously championed “traditional forms 
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2017] Short Life, Long Afterlife 1581 
of dispute resolution” for asbestos cases134 warmed to a class action strategy 
to bring asbestos litigation to a copacetic conclusion.135 
In the late 1980s, Raymark Industries, drowning in new claims,136 
announced that it would no longer offer anything but a nuisance value 
settlement, no matter a case’s strength, unless a trial date—a very rare 
commodity—approached.137 Worried that other companies would adopt this 
“scorched earth” strategy, a plaintiffs’ lawyer agreed to move jointly with 
Raymark for the certification of a mandatory class in an Atlanta federal 
court.138 The district judge immediately granted the motion and enjoined all 
other litigation against Raymark, without affording other lawyers a chance to 
weigh in.139 “Panic ensued” among plaintiffs’ lawyers, who had suddenly lost 
control over their cases.140 They sought relief from the Eleventh Circuit, 
which vacated the certification order within a month.141 But this “hasty, 
sloppy experiment” nonetheless convinced some lawyers that a better-crafted 
class action strategy might work.142 These converts included Ron Motley, the 
country’s most powerful asbestos lawyer, who had already begun global 
settlement discussions with defendants.143 
Judicial pressure began to mount, and not just from a trigger-happy judge 
in Georgia. On June 25, 1990, the Federal Judicial Center convened a meeting 
at the Dolly Madison House in Washington, D.C., with several key litigators 
and the ten federal judges with the largest asbestos dockets in attendance.144 
The attendees spitballed several solutions to the crisis145 and established an 
ad hoc committee to pursue further study.146 This step was modest, but it 
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came with a clear and important message from the judges to the litigators: 
end the chaos.147 
Events confirmed litigators’ impression that “business as usual was [not] 
going to be acceptable in the minds of the judges” any longer.148 Supervising 
the mismanaged Manville Trust, Weinstein insisted that “the time is now ripe 
for a Rule 23(b)(1)(B) global settlement” for asbestos litigation. If the parties 
did not take action, he would.149 This prospect discomfited plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
who remembered how Weinstein had slashed counsel fees in Agent Orange.150 
But Lambros acted first, certifying a mandatory class of all present and future 
claimants nationwide. Ostensibly, he did so to preserve the status quo “until 
the ad hoc committee of judges and lawyers have the opportunity to formulate 
a universal and multi-jurisdictional” solution.151 No one was happy.152 Indeed, 
four federal judges in Louisiana ordered lawyers to ignore Lambros’s order.153 
As a leading plaintiffs’ lawyer put it, things then got “stranger and 
stranger.”154 The Dolly Madison House judges signed a joint order 
superseding Lambros’s with a plan to join asbestos litigation into one 
consolidated proceeding they designated In re: National Asbestos Class 
Action.155 Lambros would supervise a nationwide Rule 23(b)(3) settlement 
class action. Parker would preside over a nationwide Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class 
action for all non-settling defendants. Claims against six defendants with 
diminished assets would go to Weinstein.156 
This blatant end-run around the MDL process foundered in the Sixth 
Circuit,157 but it gave plaintiffs’ lawyers more reason to worry that the federal 
judiciary would soon take control of asbestos litigation away from them. At a 
July 1990 meeting of leading asbestos lawyers, Thomas Henderson, a big player 
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in Rust Belt cases, circulated a couple of memoranda describing a class action 
strategy and criteria for compensating claimants pursuant to a global 
settlement.158 One memo rallied support for Linscomb, a mandatory class action 
filed in the Eastern District of Texas.159 Motley supported Henderson. “If the 
parties don’t reach consensual agreement [on a settlement framework],” Motley 
warned, “the courts will decide it and we will not control our future.”160 Another 
attempt by Weinstein to seize control of a large tranche of asbestos litigation in 
December 1990161 only “bolstered the conviction” of the Linscomb lawyers “that 
some sort of mass resolution was inevitable.”162 
Leading asbestos attorney Fred Baron had filed the very first asbestos 
class action in the early 1970s, as a longhaired civil rights lawyer “into the idea 
of freedom and justice.”163 Ironically, he now led the fight against the class 
action strategy, opposing the Linscomb tactic bitterly.164 But most asbestos 
lawyers now accepted a class action solution.165 In contrast, asbestos 
companies hated the Eastern District of Texas and long resisted a class action 
strategy.166 They refused to bargain with the Linscomb “sword of Damocles” 
hanging over their heads.167 
2. Judicial Control 
By early 1991, a judicial takeover of asbestos litigation through a class 
action had become the institutional preference of the federal courts. After 
Lambros’s failed effort to create a “mini MDL,”168 Chief Justice Rehnquist 
appointed an ad hoc committee to study the asbestos litigation crisis.169 Its 
March 1991 report described a “situation” of “critical dimensions” that “is 
getting worse.”170 “[V]irtually every federal judge who has tried to cope with 
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a substantial asbestos docket agrees that this litigation impasse cannot be 
broken except by aggregate or class proceedings,” the report declared. It 
insisted that “class actions were devised for precisely these kinds of cases,”171 
an assertion that would have struck federal judges as silly a decade earlier. 
The committee recommended that Congress and the Advisory Committee 
explore legislation or rule changes to solve the asbestos crisis with a class 
action, should Congress not replace the tort system with some sort of 
compensation scheme.172 Responding to this request,173 the Federal Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 23 designed “to 
enlarge the opportunity for mass tort litigation.”174 
Meanwhile, eight of the Dolly Madison House judges asked the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) to consolidate all federal asbestos 
litigation.175 The JPML had previously denied such requests five times.176 But 
the institutional preference of the federal judiciary for consolidation was clear, 
and the JPML could not refuse again.177 Hoping that the transferee court would 
“solv[e] the ‘asbestos mess,’” the JPML sent the cases to Charles Weiner in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.178 Tens of thousands of cases traveled to 
Philadelphia with most observers’ expectation that they would never return.179 
Weiner had a reputation as a “master settler,”180 with a well-known 
“preference for a negotiated resolution of asbestos claims, rather than 
litigation . . . .”181 In keeping with his judicial colleagues’ desires,182 Weiner 
halted almost all litigation and waited for the parties to propose a 
resolution.183 Because an inability to get trial dates diminished the likelihood 
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of settlement,184 plaintiffs’ lawyers tried to free cases from Weiner’s chambers, 
variously described as a “dark hole” or a “plaintiffs’ Armageddon.”185 But the 
JPML rejected remand requests they made and instructed the parties to work 
with Weiner to settle everything.186 
3. Following Instructions 
To the “extremely disappointed” Motley,187 Weiner had “transformed 
what could have been a global resolution of the asbestos cases into a surreal 
farce.”188 He and his colleague Joseph Rice nonetheless continued settlement 
discussions, which CCR chose to pursue after earlier negotiations with a 
larger set of lawyers had failed.189 Motley and Rice were the “biggest dogs,” 
and any deal required their buy-in.190 The parties also brought in Gene Locks, 
a prominent Philadelphia lawyer with a sizeable asbestos inventory.191 
By this point, a growing backlog had convinced CCR to replace what had 
been a liberal settlement practice192 with a “deferral registry” strategy.193 To 
discourage filings by unimpaired claimants,194 CCR refused to settle any case 
without an impending trial date unless the firm representing the claimant put 
future unimpaired clients it might represent on a court’s inactive docket. 
Only if the future client met certain medical criteria would his claim come 
off this deferral registry.195 CCR made some progress convincing courts of 
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this strategy’s wisdom by the time the JPML acted.196 In August 1992 it forced 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to accept a pleural registry for future claims in exchange 
for inventory settlements of then-pending cases in New England.197 
Motley feared that the New England settlement would offer a “blueprint” 
to Weiner for how to resolve the MDL,198 and gridlock in the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania gave the defendants additional leverage. But the plaintiffs 
had leverage too. They increasingly filed cases in state courts to avoid the 
MDL’s reach.199 “Worse than unfriendly” to defendants,200 some state judges 
scheduled mass consolidated trials as a response to CCR’s deferral registry 
strategy.201 A mass trial of 8,500 claims in a Maryland state court, for example, 
produced a huge plaintiff ’s verdict in July 1992.202 A federal class action was 
attractive to CCR because it would bring all future claims under Weiner’s 
supervision and beyond state courts’ reach.203 
Almost all of the major players now supported a class action strategy. Each 
plaintiffs’ firm would settle its existing inventories of claims in side deals, 
then agree to the class settlement requiring all future asbestos claimants (the 
class members) to seek compensation from a settlement fund. By Fall 1992 
rumors of this deal started flying, especially after Motley urged plaintiffs’ 
lawyers “to serve and file as many of your unfiled claims as soon as possible” 
lest they be treated as future claims subject to the class settlement’s reach.204 
Some colleagues reacted indignantly. “This [is] not another chicken little, sky 
is falling cry,” two plaintiffs’ lawyers wrote to the asbestos bar. They urged 
“decisiv[e]” action to thwart “the futures class action which we have vowed to 
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oppose.”205 Most, however, proved cooperative.206 CCR offered firms the 
same deal it gave Motley, Rice, and Locks: a lump sum to settle already-filed 
cases in exchange for an agreement to abstain from filing cases in the future 
that did not meet certain medical criteria.207 Many of these agreements were 
dated January 14, 1993. They provided that the class settlement, which 
incorporated the same medical criteria as conditions for claimant eligibility, 
would supersede their provisions with respect to future claims.208 
Motley, Rice, and Locks filed the class action complaint on January 15, 1993. 
Weiner certified the class on January 29, “mandat[ing] the parties to move [the] 
matter to final resolution.”209 To opponents of the class action, “opposition 
appeared to be hopeless.”210 Now established as an institutional reality, supported 
by significant stakeholders, the mass tort class action seemed to have triumphed. 
C. The Collapse 
The rest of the story is familiar. Fred Baron led a renegade crew of 
objectors in bitter legal combat against the settling parties.211 After more than 
a year of litigation and a two-month fairness hearing,212 the district court 
approved the class settlement.213 The court formally certified a Rule 23(b)(3) 
class but did not go through the rule’s analytical steps.214 Instead of evaluating 
the balance of common and individual issues, for instance, the court simply 
pronounced the class members’ interest in prompt, adequate payments as 
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sufficient to meet the predominance requirement.215 This was Rule 23’s 
administration at its most extreme, even more so than what Weinstein and 
Williams had done a decade earlier, and well beyond what proponents of the 
class action’s regulatory conception had urged in the 1970s. The practice also 
spread, and district courts in the early 1990s certified a number of mass tort 
classes.216 By 1996, the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rule 
23 to facilitate the resolution of mass torts through class settlements.217 
But the wheels quickly fell off. The Breast Implants class settlement, 
heralded in 1994 as a model for mass tort litigation management,218 
collapsed in 1995 under the weight of tens of thousands of questionable 
claims.219 The same year the Seventh Circuit decertified the blood factor 
class in Rhone-Poulenc.220 The Amchem deal drew intense critical fire for 
alleged collusion between class counsel and CCR, as the former were 
accused of accepting huge fees to sign off on a deal that seemed to benefit 
the defendants while selling out asbestos victims. In 1996, the Third Circuit 
vacated the Amchem class,221 and the Fifth Circuit vacated the Castano 
tobacco class.222 When the Supreme Court confirmed the demise of the 
Amchem settlement in 1997, it hammered the penultimate nail in the mass 
tort class action’s coffin.223 After a few last gasps,224 this litigation seemed 
destined for its grave. 
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D. The Weight Litigation Can Bear 
The Dolly Madison House judges, the ad hoc committee, and the JPML 
all favored a class settlement as the solution to the asbestos crisis. The 
Advisory Committee proposed to generalize this preference for other mass 
torts.225 Defendants had come around as well, as had powerful plaintiffs’ 
lawyers. But the Third Circuit opinion upholding the Amchem deal “just 
wouldn’t write.”226 The success of the mass tort class action would have 
suggested that, under certain circumstances, judges can exercise remarkable 
powers of law reform, subject to limits that resist principled administration. 
But as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded, “Rule 23 . . . cannot carry 
the large load . . . heaped upon it.”227 
In his magisterial treatment of mass torts, Richard Nagareda described the 
endpoint of this litigation, a global settlement, as a type of “privatized law 
reform.”228 The lawyers negotiating the deal would aim to replace claimants’ 
preexisting rights to sue in tort with a right to seek compensation from a settlement 
fund, or what Nagareda called a “private administrative regime.”229 Nagareda 
interpreted the Supreme Court’s Amchem opinion to express a straightforward 
idea: this exercise of what amounts to legislative power requires something other 
than what the settlement purports to accomplish to legitimate it.230 
Nagareda’s emphasis on the dealmaking attorneys as the prime movers— 
hence the “private” in “private administrative regime”—seems incomplete in 
light of the path asbestos litigation followed to the Amchem deal. To a 
significant extent, the lawyers responded to judicial pressure. The episode 
fits Chayes’ description of judging quite well; indeed, given the institutional 
commitment of the federal judiciary to the class action strategy, it is arguably 
the apotheosis of public law litigation. The Amchem settlement, to Nagareda 
a privatized compensation scheme, nicely fits Chayes’ description of a public 
law remedy. This is one where “the trial judge . . . become[s] the . . . manager 
of complex forms of ongoing relief,” with “widespread effects on persons not 
before the court,” and with the judge’s “continuing involvement in 
administration and implementation.”231 As much as the mass tort class action 
involved private dealmaking, so too did it implicate judicial power. 
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But Nagareda’s basic point, slightly altered, remains apt: something other 
than litigation’s outcome must legitimate the power the judge wields as she 
supervises the process. To proponents of a muscular Rule 23 in the 1970s, its 
regulatory efficacy provided the class action with crucial justification. The 
class action’s effectiveness came from its power to mobilize claims and thereby 
vindicate regulatory regimes often designed for private enforcement.232 The 
class action’s regulatory conception provided the extensive judicial power 
Rule 23 blessed with its normative foundation, but it also suggested an 
important limit: if claimants can vindicate regulatory regimes without 
aggregation, then its use triggers concerns of illegitimacy. 
Some advocates tried to defend the mass tort class action in regulatory 
conception terms, but the obvious disconnect between the onslaught of 
individually filed DES, Dalkon Shield, asbestos, and other such claims that 
had motivated the episode in the first place and the claim mobilization 
justification rendered such efforts incoherent.233 The more plausible 
justifications were what Weinstein and Williams, the original mavericks, had 
first identified—judicial economy and distributional equity.234 But Amchem 
suggested that neither judicial economy nor distributional equity could 
provide administrable limits on judicial power. 
Whether massive numbers of filings threaten to overwhelm the federal 
courts, a key to the judicial economy rationale, requires an empirical 
determination. If ever the federal courts could make this judgment correctly, 
asbestos litigation provided the best opportunity. But even here judgments 
about some threshold threat of judicial gridlock failed due to the continual 
evolution of the asbestos litigation system. The state of the asbestos world in 
January 1993 illustrates this. The MDL order had pushed filings into state 
courts, relieving federal colleagues of an increasing share of the litigation. 
Pleural registries had begun to spread.235 The Manville trust drew congressional 
attention and would soon prompt the enactment of § 524(g) to the Bankruptcy 
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Code.236 The firms that struck inventory deals in anticipation of Amchem helped 
to pioneer what has become a norm, however dubious, for mass tort litigation— 
a settlement agreement that effectively pays the firm to stop filing cases.237 
If mass torts “have persistently resolved themselves into what are essentially 
bureaucratized, aggregate settlement structures,”238 then the determination of 
when the threat of gridlock crosses a threshold to justify the sort of power a 
mass tort class action licenses is almost impossible to make.239 If this was so for 
a mass tort with asbestos’s extensive track record, an attempt to determine the 
gridlock threshold amounted to “pure speculation” in other contexts.240 
Likewise, if the danger of distributional inequity, the second justification, 
could have provided an administrable limit on judicial power, it would have 
done so in asbestos. The litigation and settlement of tens of thousands of 
claims offered a rich data set upon which courts could judge just how 
unequally claimants had fared, how much money went to something other 
than their compensation, and how much better they would fare under a class 
action settlement regime.241 Even here, however, judgment proved impossibly 
subjective. The Amchem class members would have received less than what 
Motley, Rice, and Locks obtained for their inventory clients through the side 
deals, and what they had obtained historically for their clients.242 Were 
historical averages or the side settlement figures the right baseline? In light 
of the Manville example, could the negotiating parties rightly insist on some 
parsimony to ensure sufficient assets in the future? Did the exclusion of 
unimpaired claimants from recovery better reflect their value in a litigation 
system increasingly inclined toward pleural registries? If after more than a 
decade of experimentation a court could not answer such questions 
objectively for asbestos litigation, the likelihood it could do so with 
confidence for less well-litigated claims was low. 
In hindsight, the failure of the mass tort class action seems all but inevitable. 
In the early 1990s, litigation’s institutional footprint shrank in a number of 
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domains. Concerns over a litigation explosion and the rise of an imperial 
judiciary had become gospel for successive presidential administrations,243 and 
such criticisms of American civil justice fueled Congress’s litigation agenda 
after the mid-term elections of 1994.244 Chayes’s celebratory story about 
litigation, with the fulsome judicial power it included, faded, to be replaced by 
one markedly more suspicious of the process’s aggressive deployment.245 
Legislated limits to securities fraud and civil rights class actions in the mid-
1990s reflected this new restrictive spirit, as did a package of Rule 23 
amendments the Advisory Committee considered in 1996.246 
To one participant in the Amchem episode, the settlement’s approval came 
from the judge’s “need to act . . . in a legislative manner.”247 The class action 
strategy emerged after a decade of other failures, including Congress’s 
repeated inability to replace the embattled tort system with an alternative 
compensation regime.248 The sense that courts had assumed too much 
prerogative belonging to other branches fueled the reaction to judicial power 
in the 1970s, one that ultimately bore policy fruit in the 1990s.249 Had 
litigation unbound in the guise of the mass tort class action endured in this 
time of retrenchment, its success would have proven a striking anomaly. 
III. THE AFTERLIFE OF THE MASS TORT CLASS ACTION 
The mass tort experiment has had a long and powerful afterlife for the 
class action. Its doctrinal influence remains potent, as decisions like Amchem 
and Ortiz continue to govern Rule 23’s administration.250 Class action 
 
243 See, e.g., STUART M. GERSON ET AL., A PLAN TO IMPROVE AMERICA’S SYSTEM OF CIVIL 
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JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND 
AFFORDABILITY (1986). 
244 The Contract With America Congress enacted securities fraud class action reform, and it passed 
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jurisprudence continues to owe a great deal to the episode. John Coffee drew 
extensively on asbestos and other mass torts to develop his influential 
entrepreneurial litigation model.251 His and others’ concern with agency costs 
arising in profit-seeking aggregate litigation cast the class action in a different 
light from what proponents of the regulatory conception celebrated in the 
1970s.252 To these proponents, the judge played a leading, heroic role, 
remaking social and economic orders through litigation while exercising 
broad, nearly unbound power. Viewed through an entrepreneurial litigation 
lens, the judge acts more as an observer trying to keep lawyers, now at center 
stage, from harming class members. 
Perhaps most importantly, the mass tort class action contributed 
significantly to an institutional shift in the structure of class action governance. 
This shift, which reinvigorated appellate control over the elaboration of class 
action doctrine, ensures that Rule 23 and the judicial power it licenses remain 
confined within strict limits. The courts of appeals actively policed class action 
doctrine in the early 1970s.253 By 1978, however, avenues for appellate review 
of class certification decisions narrowed significantly.254 The 1980s passed with 
a remarkable dearth of appellate guidance on controverted issues.255 The 
district courts had wide discretion for Rule 23’s administration, an allocation 
of authority between court levels that facilitated the broad exercise of judicial 
power within relaxed legal constraints. 
The mass tort class action drew appellate courts back into class action 
administration in at least two ways. First, parties fighting the certification of mass 
tort classes petitioned for extraordinary appellate relief with particular success.256 
In other contexts, courts of appeals in the 1970s and 1980s had to surmount 
high barriers to review class certification orders.257 But appellate courts could 
not ignore the largesse of judicial power that the certification of a mass tort 
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class required, and review of the certification of mass tort classes became 
common.258 By the mid-1990s, the mass tort class action had reinvigorated 
appellate input into the design of class action doctrine. 
Second, the mass tort class action prompted a round of rulemaking in the 
1990s that ultimately led to Rule 23(f). Proposals to facilitate interlocutory 
review of class certification orders had surfaced in the 1970s and 1980s.259 But 
it took the mass tort class action to convince the Advisory Committee to end 
its “moratorium” on the consideration of Rule 23 amendments in 1991.260 This 
round of rulemaking produced Rule 23(f), itself importantly connected to the 
circuit-level mass tort decisions.261 The committee considered a wide range of 
potentially transformative proposals, prompting deep conflict and prolonged 
debate.262 But renewed appellate engagement with Rule 23 led the committee 
to cede the prerogative for more important adjustments to class action doctrine 
to the federal courts.263 The committee expected that the courts of appeals 
would play an important supervisory role for the class action going forward.264 
Rule 23(f) has effectively entrenched and expanded appellate engagement 
with class action doctrine in domains well beyond mass tort litigation, resulting 
in the elaboration of a legal regime for the governance of the class action.265 To 
a district judge like Lambros or Weiner, the class certification decision was a 
discretionary exercise in case management. To a court of appeals, a Rule 23(f) 
appeal is an invitation to draw legal boundaries.266 As these boundaries have 
proliferated, a district court’s range of discretion narrows.267 
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Not only has a regime developed, it has developed to constrain district 
court power to certify classes.268 For most of Rule 23(f)’s existence, 
conservatives have dominated the courts of appeals, with predictable results 
for class action doctrine.269 But permanent structural features of appellate 
review unrelated to ideology have also generated this retrenchment. One of 
these features is attitudinal and relational. An appellate judge who votes to 
reverse the denial of class certification increases the likelihood that the district 
court would feel obliged to certify the class on remand. The district court, 
supposed to have “wide discretion” over the class certification decision,270 is 
now saddled with a time-consuming case it had already judged as 
unmanageable.271 A decision vacating a grant of class certification, in contrast, 
frees the district court of this burden, even if it is a welcome one. Also, 
plaintiffs’ lawyers file significantly fewer Rule 23(f) petitions than 
defendants’.272 Parties’ and lawyers’ incentives, another structural feature, 
readily explains this reality.273 It only stands to reason that case law will tend 
to drift to favor the side that sets the appellate agenda.274 
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CODA? 
In April 2016, the Third Circuit upheld a massive class settlement resolving 
20,000 concussion-related tort claims against the National Football League, 
ending Rule 23’s near-total exile from mass tort litigation.275 Amchem all but killed 
the mass tort class action for nearly two decades. Whence its reincarnation? 
If mass tort litigation had great significance for the class action, the class 
action was never more than a “sideshow” for mass tort litigation.276 Amchem 
didn’t stop litigators from making Amchem-like deals to resolve mass tort 
liability. They continue to do so, just without Rule 23.277 The most notorious 
example involves the so-called “all-or-nothing” settlement. Defendants offer 
huge sums to settle, but they fund the deal only if a supermajority of 
individual plaintiffs agree to its terms. A plaintiffs’ lawyer who stands to 
receive a third of each client’s payout has an overwhelming incentive to 
convince her hundreds of individually retained clients to acquiesce. 
Moreover, she stops filing cases; doing so only increases the denominator and 
thus makes the defendants’ threshold all the more difficult to meet. 
Such settlements truly create Nagareda’s “private administrative regimes.” 
Judges have no more explicit authority to intervene in what are effectively 
thousands of individual contracts negotiated between defendants and 
plaintiffs than they would have to scuttle a settlement in an ordinary 
individual action.278 Perhaps for this reason, and perhaps because endemic 
conflicts of interest give these non-class settlements such a seamy 
underbelly,279 the class action holds some appeal.280 If litigators will find a 
way to the same result anyway, why not bring litigation under Rule 23’s aegis 
and ensure that judges have some say over what deals get struck? 
This question smacks of similar logic that supported the mass tort class 
action experiment in the first instance. Weinstein, Williams, and others 
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believed that a class action could perform better than an overtaxed tort system 
struggling to render equitable justice efficiently. But such utilitarianism was 
insufficient in the 1990s to legitimate Rule 23’s foray into the personal injury 
domain. Perhaps the move back to Rule 23 that the NFL Concussion 
settlement heralds will ultimately demonstrate that the federal judiciary had 
it right all along when it committed to the class action as a path out of the 
asbestos morass. Or perhaps this episode will be but a coda and prove the old 
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